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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT
LUNAR MODULE INSTRUMENTATION SUBSYSTEM
By David E. O’Brien and Jared R. Woodfill IV
Manned Spacecraft Center
SUMMARY
The lunar module instrumentation subsystem processes approximately 250 meas-
urements during each mission for display, caution and warning, and telemetry. These
measurements include analog measurements (pressure, temperature, and quantity) and
discrete measurements (switch closures and step voltages). Some problems were en-
countered with the various components of the subsystem from manufacturing through
preflight checkout, but the subsystem performed well in flight. The only inflight prob-
lems were broken spacecraft wires going to the lunar module 5 data storage electronics
assembly and to a pressure transducer on lunar module 4, noticeable data shifts on
two lunar module 4 pressure transducers and a lunar module 3 water quantity measuring
device, and nuisance caution and warning alarms. The primary preflight problems
were pressure transducers shifting off calibration (usually less than 5 percent), water
quantity measuring devices shifting off calibration (3 to 10 percent), and interface prob-
lems involving the signal conditioning electronics assembly. The pressure transducers
were redesigned to alleviate the shifting problem. Modifications to the interface cir-
cuits were required to overcome the signal conditioning and nuisance caution and warn-
ing alarm problems.
INTRODUCTION
The lunar module (LM) instrumentation subsystem monitors the LM subsystems
during preflight and inflight activities and prepares the data for entry into the pulse
code modulation and timing electronics assembly (PCMTEA) and subsequent transmis-
sion to the Manned Space Flight Network (MSFN). In addition, critical parameters are
monitored for out-of-tolerance conditions, and voice and time-correlation data (TCD)
are stored for recovery after the return to earth.
DISCUSSION
The LM instrumentation subsystem consists of a signal conditioning electronics
assembly (SCEA), a caution and warning electronics assembly (CWEA), a data storage
electronics assembly (DSEA), and transducers (fig. 1). Each ofthese components is
discussed separately in the following sections.
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Figure 1. Lunar module instrumentation subsystem.
Signal Conditioning Electronics Assembly
The SCEA converts all unconditioned transducer (sensor) signals and events with
one or more of its seven basic subassemblies to the proper voltage levels required by
the PCMTEA, CWEA, and displays. Isolation also is provided between the CWEA and
the other users of a shared signal. The seven basic subassemblies are dc amplifiers,
dc attenuators, ac-to-dc converters, analog and discrete isolating buffers, frequency-
to-dc converters, resistance-to-dc converters, and phase-sensitive demodulators
(figs. 2 to 11). The SCEA consists of two chassis called electronic replaceable assem-
blies (fig. 12), each of which has a capacity of 22 subassemblies. The electronic re-
placeable assembly (ERA) provides the interface connections between the subassemblies
and the unconditioned signals. Each subassembly can be replaced easily with another
subassembly of the same type, even after the ERA has been installed in the flight
vehicle.
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Figure 12. Electronic replaceable to the shape dictated by the space in the aft
assembly, equipment bay. Much of this flexibility was
lost, however, during a weight-saving pro-
gram that resulted in removal of all spare
wiring. The removal of the spare wiring requires that wires be added or rerouted (or
both) whenever an ERA subassembly is replaced with another type of subassembly or
whenever a subassembly is added to an ERA spare location. The signal-conditioning
requirements for the remaining vehicles were supposedly firm when this decision was
made, but subsequent requirement changes have been costly to implement because of
the charges for retention of personnel to perform the work and the acceptance test pro-
cedure (ATP).
The circuits were designed according to the following ground rules.
1. No ground or common loops in the instrumentation subsystem
2. Minimal fault propagation
3. Multirange capability for each subassembly
These ground rules required that the SCEA provide isolation between the CWEA and
PCMTEA (both grounded systems), isolation between the monitoring systems (CWEA,
PCMTEA, and displays) and grounded sources (batteries and transducers), and isola-
tion between the battery ground and the signal ground. A further requirement was that
the SCEA be designed to protect the CWEA from the effect of failures in the pulse code
modulator (by a short across an output or a failure in a circuit) and that each subassem-
bly be capable of accepting signals with a variety of ranges.
To accomplish the requirements established by these ground rules, isolation
transformers, independent power supplies in each subassembly, and trim potentiom-
eters were needed in the complex circuits. Approximately 16 500 parts are required
for each SCEA to provide 266 channels of signal conditioning.
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In manufacturing these subassemblies, welded cordwood construction (with full
encapsulation in potting) was chosen because this method provides the highest packing
density and reliability. The only problems involved with the manufacturing were those
resulting from the extremely high packing density of the modules.
With so many welds, it was easy to overlook one or more, and it was difficult for
the inspectors to find any manufacturing errors. This situation resulted in many re-
worked units and a delay in the deliveries. Only nominal piece-part failures occurred
during the qualification tests and in flight. The most significant of these failures were
shorted transformers and cracked Mepco resistors. An additional thermal cycle was
incorporated into the ATP to identify these weak components.
Some difficulties arose during the vehicle/instrumentation-subsystem integration.
One of the most difficult problems involved the discrete buffer that monitors the reac-
tion control subsystem (RCS) thruster commands in the attitude and translation control
assembly (ATCA) (fig. 13). The discrete buffer is designed to monitor either mechan-
ical or solid-state switch closures. The buffer gives a 5-volt ON signal when the re-
sistance across mechanical contacts drops below 120 000 ohms or when the voltage
across a solid-state switch drops below 4 volts with a corresponding drop in resistance.
The firing command is given in the ATCA by grounding the low side of a solenoid through
a transistor switch. The inputs of the discrete buffers are connected across the tran-
sistor so that, when the system is activated, the buffer input senses 28 volts until a
firing command is given; then, voltage drops to zero and the buffers produce a 5-volt
ON output signal. The problem arose when the solenoid circuit breaker was open and
no voltage was present across the transistor and buffer inputs. The high emitter-to-
collector resistance normally prevents the buffer from giving the ON signal. However,
during these periods of no voltage on the transistor, the buffer would occasionally out-
put the 5-volt ON signal. This problem was attributed to noise on the power ground to
which one side of the buffer was connected. This connection was moved to signal ground,
and the other input remained on the high side (emitter) of the transistor.
3 RCS thruster solenoid
+28Vdc 3
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’-W^’
|\ //1 l-^AArT 5V SON PCMTEA
^-^/’/ k
’1
^
,Power T 7\
ground l______|-__---i 1-- Signal ground
Figure 13. Discrete buffer, showing the lead to power ground rerouted
to signal ground.
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After this change, RCS tests were performed at the White Sands Test Facility
(WSTF), and a new problem appeared in the form of short-firing indications. The
buffer would give the ON command and then go OFF after a few seconds while the ATCA
was still firing the thrusters. The cause of this problem was traced to the setup at the
WSTF. The ATCA and the SCEA were located in the blockhouse, and command wires
were routed to the pad where the thruster and the electrical power were located.
Therefore, the ground wire leading from the collector of the transistors was approxi-
mately 200 feet in length (fig. 14). When the firing command was given, the voltage at
the transistor dropped to zero, but rose to 6 volts as the current through the solenoid
increased. This 6-volt rise was caused by the IR (current x resistance) drop across
the 200-foot ground lead. If the buffer had been connected in the original configuration,
with its low side on the collector instead of on signal ground, this short-firing indica-
tion would not have occurred. Only a small (0. 5 volt) drop across the transistor rather
than the 6-volt drop between the transistor and the battery ground would have reached
the buffer. No modification was made to the WSTF test setup after the problem had
been identified.
^i- RCS thruster solenoid_______________
+28Vdc
---C i_mm------___Z-- SCEA
^~\
^
k V ON PCMTEAl^ ’-’
---^/^-I /Isolated
’\ J inputs
^^
\ \~
Power ----------------L.-.,,.- "!"---. signal ground
ground ^y--
200ft
Figure 14. Discrete buffer, showing how the 200-foot ground lead produced a
+6-V dc potential between SCEA and signal ground.
Meanwhile, the first problem (spurious jet firing) still was occurring occasionally.
Further investigation revealed that some of the ATCA transistors had a low emitter-to-
collector resistance of approximately 120 000 to 130 000 ohms. This low resistance,
with noise on the power ground, was sufficient to trigger the buffer into the ON state
sporadically. With the new information, the low side of the buffer input was returned
to the collector side of the transistor, and a 50 000-ohm resistor was placed between
the SCEA circuit breaker and the emitter side of the ATCA transistor (fig. 15). This
resistor formed a voltage divider whenever the SCEA was energized and maintained
approximately 18 volts across the buffer input until the transistor switched on and the
voltage dropped to approximately 0. 5 volt. The current through the resistor and tran-
sistor was negligible with the transistor on or off. This arrangement proved to be a
satisfactory fix for the interface incompatibility.
The first problem occurred again when the open-contact resistance of a relay de-
creased with usage until it reached the 120 000-ohm level and triggered the buffer on.
This condition was eliminated in a similar manner.
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Figure 15. Discrete buffer, showing how a 50 000-ohm resistor between SCEA power
and ATCA transistor produced approximately 18 V dc when transistor was off.
The worst prelaunch vehicle problem with the SCEA involved intermittent failures.
Some instances occurred when measurements that were inexplicably bad for a short
time cleared up before the defective item in the measurement link could be identified.
Extensive testing of the suspected components was required to repeat the failure. Some
of the SCEA subassemblies underwent several thermal vacuum tests and many thousands
of operational cycles before they would repeat a failure mode. Overall, there were few
prelaunch vehicle problems at the NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center and no inflight
failures of the SCEA.
The basic design concepts and the resulting SCEA have proved adequate to satisfy
the signal-conditioning requirements of the LM instrumentation. The only major draw-
back to the present SCEA is the lack of flexibility in subassembly arrangement in the
electronic replaceable assemblies. When the weight-saving campaign resulted in re-
moval of all wiring not being used for existing circuits, the type of subassembly for a
given location was fixed, and the spare locations were useless. Although the majority
of the signal-conditioning requirements have remained unchanged, some of the spare
locations and all of the unused subassembly channels should have been kept fully wired
to meet new requirements. In addition, there should be a means of changing the ranges
of the resistance-to-dc converters without reworking either the subassembly or the ERA.
The changes caused by new requirements and the range of the resistance-to-dc convert-
ers have been very costly because of this inflexibility.
Caution and Warning Electronics Assembly
The concept of a real-time monitoring system to provide the LM crew caution and
warning signals by an alarm tone and master-alarm indicator light evolved in 1965. An
approach was taken in which the most critical parameters would be processed by a sin-
gle unit called the CWEA (fig. 16). Software requirements for the logic of the unit
(which included inhibits, enables, and level detectors) were determined through coor-
dination with the LM subsystem engineers for the critical subsystems. A vendor was
selected on the basis of technical and production capability and proximity to the LM
contractor. Welded cordwood construction was selected as the fabrication and packaging
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Parts vendors were selected by the CWEA vendor to provide the 3000 parts for
each CWEA. All parts requests were processed and approved by the LM contractor,
with NASA concurrence. A major testing program was conducted to evaluate relays,
and a miniature Wabco type was selected.
A program of monthly meetings was established at the vendor facility to permit
periodic discussion of technical problems, delivery-status monthly progress, costs,
manpower, and testing by LM contractor representatives, NASA engineering represent-
atives, and others related to the current program problems. During these meetings,
many problems were solved through the coordination of experienced LM contractor,
vendor, and NASA engineers who traded ideas and suggested solutions to problems.
In 1966 and 1967, delivery of the CWEA became the pacing item for total LM com-
pletion as defined by the Program Evaluation and Reporting Technique network instituted
by the LM contractor. Production was expedited at the vendor facility, and the design
verification test (DVT) models and their associated tests were deleted. A DVT unit then
was used satisfactorily in the LM test article 8 (LTA-8) thermal vacuum test-vehicle
program, thus reducing schedule difficulties and costs for the overall CWEA program.
Changes to the CWEA, resulting from LM-system-design modifications, were made
with no impact upon final LM-delivery dates.
A thorough qualification test program was an integral part of the total CWEA pro-
gram; design, fabrication, and test preparation were accomplished concurrently with
CWEA assembly. One manual test station and two automatic test stations were manu-
factured by the vendor and successfully used for the qualification tests, which were
successful also.
12
The manufacture of the CWEA was completed with the occurrence of only one se-
rious problem. Improper setup of a thermal curing chamber caused an entire assembly
to be overstressed and scrapped. A reallocation of assembled units prevented the loss
of the unit from affecting LM delivery.
Throughout the test program and whenever problems occurred, NASA engineers
traveled to the LM contractor and vendor facilities to monitor tests and to implement
solutions to these problems. The greatest NASA input to the CWEA program occurred
when CWEA integration into the LM indicated numerous unforeseen system difficulties.
Most of the difficulty arose from lack of system planning earlier in the total LM pro-
gram and a lack of communication between the subsystem managers and the caution and
warning system managers. A series of weekly (and, later, monthly) meetings was in-
stituted at the LM contractor facility at the request of NASA to work out immediate so-
lutions to the system difficulties. A representative from the NASA Manned Spacecraft
Center (MSC) participated in these meetings, and the system problems were solved.
The CWEA performed in an outstanding manner on the lunar missions, and a pro-
gram was set up by NASA to analyze all recorded master alarms for system problems
before, during, and after the lunar mission. As a result of this program, information
was compiled in semitechnical language and drawings on all known caution and warning
alarms caused by interface idiosyncrasies. Additions and deletions were incorporated
in later revisions as engineering changes were implemented and as analyses of test and
mission data revealed additional system incompatibilities. This information is con-
tained in the appendix of this paper. Because of the lack of latching CWEA circuitry,
some difficulty was encountered in identifying the channel that initiated a master alarm.
A more suitable CWEA design would have included latching/resettable CWEA inputs on
every channel rather than on one-third of the channels. Also, the level detectors would
preferably have been field adjustable. Several CWEA functions had to be deleted be-
cause of measurement-range changes that caused the CWEA to trip at unwanted levels.
The success of the CWEA program resulted from a continued dialogue that in-
cluded representatives of NASA; representatives of the LM contractor; and vendor de-
sign, test, and systems engineers. Such communication ensured quick identification
and satisfactory resolution of problems through a coordinated Government-industry
operation that typified the entire Apollo Program.
Data Storage Electronics Assembly
The DSEA is a single-speed magnetic tape recorder that stores voice and mission
elapsed time (fig. 17). A maximum recording time of 10 hours is provided by driving
the tape in one direction, reversing direction, and switching to the next track when
the end of the tape has been reached. Four tracks can be recorded, with a total of
2-1/2 hours of data recorded on each track. The DSEA has only the recording function,
and the tape must be played at a specially built ground station.
A specially designed 400-hertz, single-phase, hysteresis, synchronous motor was
used to provide constant, steady (+/-0. 1 percent of input power frequency) tape motion at
the low speed of 0. 6 in/sec. The voice-frequency recording capability is limited to
300 to 3000 hertz, and the timing signals are recorded as a 4625-hertz signal for a
13
|&
Audio center DSEA ;^
Sh a^er --Voice to headset Commander’s Q
115-V
-^f
^bus A H- -i
.^R.
<(C)> Voice Voice
icTw amplifier
Intercommunication system (ICSI
transmitfreceive o---------i-- Eniib"’ TCD
.-O--OOFF mue D,,rfpr Intercom (mission elapsed time) from
-L
"ire ,.....------ swnct} bus PCMTEA serial time-codei1--’"’"""’ I--____ generator
Ivoice for intercom bus ___{___
To very-high-frequency (vhfl A, B, TCD
and S-band VOX keying circuits ""’""I’"01’
"_ ,---ICSIVOX- PTTI M
M BiasU Microphone oscillator ^ecord"
1-------I I------I I------I I--- --n 7 I-------I heads
VOX VOX Microphone I-------I
sensitivity-^ circuit 4- ^"s’stor and DSEA
^
Microphone Reference
control (trigger) swltch VOX key ""P"^ ^’"^^
Voices-band t
-.__--
^
Playback
relay, vhf, or I--- ]ower
microphone from^_____________
^
B-----| converter L’’"^s-I
premodulation o^
processor ON Supply
^Sa Buffer -^-^..OFF flowe’’W DSEA and filter "’ DSEA key relay
VOX ""VOX,_______ key -----7^7 -^------- T-r-
sensitivity 0
^">1 Tape recorder ,..,
supply ^o lCSfPTT Q ON Recorder
,20V del PTT __?>_ ^-------- "1c"cato^W^-Jf. clrcult Ta
PTT from electrical Commander’s
dnve
umbilicals or attitude 28-V debus M
Note: PTT push to talk controller assemblies
TCD time-correlation data ^PS
VOX voice-operated relay
Figure 17. Functional block diagram of DSEA.
"zero" and as a 4175-hertz signal for a "one." In addition, a 5200-hertz signal is re-
corded as a reference to reduce flutter during tape playback. Steady tape movement
(provided by the motor) and sharp filtering are required for effective recording and
playback.
A tape cartridge is used because it is the most efficient way to handle the tape
each time it is removed for playback and replacement. Negator springs are used in the
cartridge to assist the drive motors and to maintain the proper tension on the tape. A
pair of negator springs is installed on each of the coaxial reels of the cartridge; these
springs apply a force that tends to wind the tape onto the reel. The motor-drive cap-
stans pull the tape from one reel and wind up the pair of negator springs for that reel
while the negator springs for the other reel wind the tape onto that reel.
During developmental testing, it was very difficult to keep the flutter (tape-speed
variations) within the specification of 3 percent during vibration. Extensive tests and
studies revealed that the problem existed because the cartridge contact in the head and
capstan area of the transport was too firm, causing the vibration of the reels to be fed
to the recording area and increasing the flutter. The cartridge and the tiedown system
were modified slightly to alleviate this problem.
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After the qualification tests had been completed, the vibration levels were raised
because of a program at MSC to identify weak components. During the requalification
testing at the higher vibration levels, the flutter again exceeded specification to approx-
imately 5 percent. This high flutter could not be corrected without an extensive rede-
sign. Most of the units had already been built, and the cost of modifying them would
have been prohibitive. It was decided to waive the flutter requirement because the units
performed properly with no signs of damage after the vibration, because the vibration
levels were higher than flight vibration levels, and because voice reproduction was sat-
isfactory at the higher flutter level. Only the timing data are lost at the higher flutter,
and the highest vibration during a mission occurs during descent or ascent. The re-
corder runs continuously shortly before and during descent or ascent; therefore, the
time from the last good tuning signal received is easily determined if the timing drops
out. In fact, no significant timing losses have occurred during the LM flights.
Another design problem was presented by lubricant leaking from the bearings in
the tape cartridge. A small amount of lubricant was used in the small bearings; how-
ever, during long idle periods (2 to 3 months), the lubricant drained out, creating the
possibility of slippage between the tape and capstan and fouling of the recording heads.
Extensive testing showed that very little or no lubricant was required in the cartridge.
This problem was solved by initiating a new lubrication specification that required only
a very small amount of lubricant and by operating the units for 30 minutes every
120 days.
During flights, the only problem experienced was the breaking of vehicle wires
leading to the DSEA. The small 26-gage signal wires broke on three vehicles and
caused the loss of all data from the Apollo 11 DSEA. Also, during normal insertion
of the cartridge, the tape was damaged. The cartridge had to be inserted at an angle
so that the upper edge of the tape contacted the capstans first. It took the full force re-
quired to unwind enough tape from the reels to make good contact with the capstans.
This force caused the upper edges at the beginning of the tape to become wrinkled and
cupped after several loadings. The use of a loading tool, which was developed to allow
straight insertion of the cartridge, prevented the damage.
Any future voice recorders should use an easily insertable cartridge and a voice-
operated-relay (VOX) circuit in the recorder. During the lunar missions, the crew
does not use the VOX mode because of voice clipping, but keeps the intercom and DSEA
on continuously. This procedure results in the DSEA running out of tape before the end
of the mission. A VOX circuit in the DSEA, independent of the audio center, would have
allowed a much more efficient use of tape. In addition, the time required for the re-
corder to be operating is becoming longer with each mission. Because the cartridge
cannot be easily replaced during flight, the only way in which these new requirements
can be met is by adding another DSEA or a VOX circuit between the DSEA and the audio
center.
Transducers
The LM instrumentation transducers sense physical data such as temperature,
valve and switch positions, pressure, and water and propellant quantities. The trans-
ducers then convert this physical data to electrical signals that are compatible with the
SCEA, PCMTEA, and CWEA and with the panel meters. All but one of the transducers
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employ integral signal conditioning that produces the standard 0- to 5-volt dc output.
The temperature-transducer outputs are routed to the SCEA where they are converted
to the standard 0- to 5-volt dc signal. All the transducers that use integral signal con-
ditioning (except temperature transducers, which require no power) receive power
through the signal-sensor circuit breaker and through individual fuses in the fuse sensor
assembly.
The transducer designs were selected on the basis of accuracy, power consump-
tion, size, weight, reliability, developmental time and cost, multirange capability,
mounting requirements, background of the device, and possible effects on the system
to be monitored. Most of the transducers were developed by modifying commercial
equipment; however, these modified transducers caused most of the instrumentation
problems. Units that could pass qualification tests could be produced, but the units
were not reliable if they were produced in quantity. The only transducer that has been
trouble-free is the resistance-thermometer type used to measure temperatures.
The switches used to detect LM landing-gear deployment and to turn on the track-
ing lights and floodlights are modified versions of commercial hardware. Normally,
these pushbutton devices are made of stainless steel. However, the LM versions are
the only aluminum switches qualified for the space environment. To save weight, alu-
minum was used for everything in the switches except the springs and contacts. This
use of aluminum created special design considerations, such as finding an epoxy that
has the same thermal expansion characteristics as aluminum within a temperature
range of -260 to +260 F. Another problem that developed during vacuum-chamber
tests was that the contacting aluminum parts would cold-weld together. All the parts
that had to move freely were plated with a dry film lubricant to prevent any sticking.
The only vehicle problem concerned a manufacturing deficiency in one lot. The collar
on the plunger was badly crimped; however, this defect was easily detected by X-ray
and was isolated to one lot.
Two types of pressure transducers were developed to provide two sources for
hardware. The designs of these transducers are entirely different, and different prob-
lems have occurred. The transducers are mechanically and electrically interchange-
able and have identical pressure ranges. Both transducers are designed so that the
outer case serves as a leak-proof chamber that can withstand the monitored pressure
if the sensing element leaks or ruptures.
One type of transducer consisted of a sensor with a semiconductor strain-gage
network mounted on a diaphragm and of an electronics package built with discrete parts.
The electronics components have performed very well, but the sensor has been prone to
erratic, unpredictable shifts caused by the strain gages. Screening techniques during
and after delivery isolated the defective shifters, but no method has been found to pro-
duce a highly reliable pressure transducer of this type. A similar problem occurred
with the water quantity measuring device (WQMD); this problem is discussed in a later
section of this report.
Another problem occurred with the high-temperature version of the first type of
transducer. This problem involved a very low manufacturing yield of acceptable trans
ducers. By offsetting the center of the diaphragm and increasing the size of the fillet
(the portion of the diaphragm that connects to the transducer barrel), the yield of good
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Itransducers rose to an acceptable level; however, a new problem occurred. The new
feed-through header required for the diaphragm change was subject to damage during
manufacturing. This damage resulted in slow leaks. A stringent, 24-hour, overpres-
sure leak test was incorporated to identify the leaky transducers.
The other type of pressure transducer had a twisted Bourdon tube with a variable-
reluctance position sensor and a hybrid thin-film electronics package. The sensing
element has been extremely stable, but the electronics package caused much trouble.
Eventually, the electronics package was redesigned using discrete components, a
method that produced good results in the first transducer electronics package. With
the new electronics package, this transducer has worked quite well. Few pressure
transducers of either design have failed during flight.
The WQMD caused more problems than any other item in the instrumentation sub-
system. The WQMD is a temperature-compensated pressure transducer that produces
an extremely nonlinear output. This transducer consists of a strain-gage network and
a resistance thermometer (for temperature compensation) mounted on a diaphragm.
The electronics portion takes the strain-gage resistances and produces a linear quantity
output; this output is nonlinear in regard to the pressure. The pressure drop for a unit
of water usage is much greater for a nearly full- water tank than for a nearly empty
water tank. This pressure drop forces the electronics unit to produce a nonlinear out-
put with regard to the pressure remaining. Also, the WQMD can be adjusted to produce
a 100-percent-full reading for a water-tank loading of from 45 percent to 75 percent full.
In this case, the electronics unit compensates for the differently shaped curves of
amount of water remaining compared with pressure for any of these loadings. The
more fully loaded tanks produced the most bowed curves. Originally, the WQMD was
designed for only a 75-percent-full loading. Later, it was modified to accept a smaller
loading. The WQMD always has been plagued with shift problems related to the strain
gages. The strain gages would shift or become nonohmic (shorted) for no apparent
reason. Extensive studies revealed that contaminants in the silicon dioxide coating
caused the strain gages to become nonohmic. The time required for the occurrence of
this condition varied with (1) the amount of voltage and the amount of time it was applied,
(2) the amount of contaminants, and (3) the temperature. Nothing was found to eliminate
the problem. No screen test was reliable, and the problem could not be solved easily.
Thus, the WQMD was replaced with the Bourdon tube-type pressure transducer on
LM-9 and later vehicles. The conversion from pressure to amount of water remaining
is accomplished by ground personnel.
Before the launch of LM-4, one of the installed water quantity measuring devices
failed. Investigation showed that iodine in the water tanks had corroded through the
WQMD diaphragm. It was the only WQMD to show signs of this type of corrosion.
Tests were indicative that the iodine would attack the inclusions (impurities) in the dia-
phragm. The diaphragm and body of the WQMD are milled from a single piece of
Ni Span-C alloy (nickel base). The grain of the metal is perpendicular to the surface
of the diaphragm. With the grain alined in this manner, needle-shaped impurities also
are alined perpendicular to the diaphragm. If these impurities are long enough, the dia-
phragm is penetrated. Usually, these impurities are not long enough to cause penetra-
tion. Several methods to correct the problem were considered: (I) building the
diaphragm out of a different material, (2) building new diaphragms out of Ni Span-C
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with the grain alined parallel to the surface so that inclusions would not penetrate the
diaphragm, or (3) finding a protective coating for the diaphragm. This last method was
chosen because it had the least cost and time impact. Gold, silver, and platinum
platings were ineffective; and, eventually, an epoxy was chosen that worked well.
This epoxy coating, however, caused another problem. The epoxy absorbed a
small amount of water and swelled slightly. This swelling depressed the diaphragm,
causing a positive shift of 3 to 5 percent in the output. This shift was minimized by
making the epoxy coating as thin and as uniform as possible. Tests were run to deter-
mine the amount of shift, then repeated to determine the repeatability. Acceptance of
a unit was based on a repeatability of not more than 1 percent of the original reading.
The amount of shift caused by the epoxy absorbing water was used to bias the error out
of the flight data.
Although numerous failures occurred during testing and the WQMD was replaced
eventually with absolute pressure transducers, only one of the 15 water quantity meas-
uring devices drifted out of specification during a mission.
The propellant quantity measuring device (PQMD) used to monitor the RCS fuel
level was essentially the same device as the WQMD. The PQMD was designed to meas-
ure higher pressures man the WQMD, and the PQMD has a much smaller diaphragm.
This smaller diaphragm is an installation requirement. In contrast to the WQMD, very
few problems and failures were experienced with the PQMD; the failures were only 1 to
2 percent out of tolerance. The only explanation so far presented is that the PQMD is
not as sensitive to shift because it operates at higher pressures. The history of these
two devices, both manufactured by the same vendor, makes it apparent that a great
deal is yet to be discovered about semiconductor strain-gage technology.
CONCLUS IONS AND RECO/VWIENDAT IONS
Although many failures and problems occurred during development and vehicle
integration tests, the lunar module instrumentation subsystem performed well during
missions. This performance has been accomplished by testing to determine the cause
of the problems, then developing a cure for the problems or a screening test to elimi-
nate the problem items. From the experience gained from vehicle integration tests, it
is obvious that all components of the instrumentation subsystem must be as versatile
as possible to accept changing interfaces and the eccentricities of those interfaces.
The following recommendations are made for signal conditioning.
1. Use plug-in modules to the lowest subassembly practical in order to have the
smallest impact in case of failure.
2. Make all range changes easily accessible.
3. Make all module locations (including spares) on the chassis capable of accept-
ing any type of subassembly.
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4. Make the discrete signal conditioners trip at as low a resistance as possible
to prevent high resistance (120 000 ohms or less) from causing false indication.
5. Have ground-support-equipment connectors for testing and monitoring all in-
puts and outputs.
The following recommendations are made for the caution and warning system.
1. Make all functions latching and resettable.
2. Make all analog level detectors easily adjustable and capable of being inhibited
or enabled.
3. Have a number of spare discrete and analog detectors available for any new
requirements. These spare detectors should be capable of being easily connected
(either by jumper wires at the connectors or by easily manufactured plug-in jumper
modules) to create the desired circuit.
4. Have inhibit and enable signals for major events (such as ascent/descent
staging) that can be routed to any of the circuits.
The following recommendations are made for voice recording.
1. Use cartridges that do not require any special skill for installation and re-
placement and that protect the tape as much as possible during storage and handling.
2. Have a built-in voice-operated circuit provided with an external override.
The following recommendations are made for transducers.
1. Have adjustments available to compensate for small (less than 10 percent)
long-term drifts.
2. Thoroughly investigate materials used for compatibility to their environment
and potential environment. This investigation would include cold-welding in a vacuum,
thermal expansion, and corrosive and oxygen exposure.
3. Ensure that all transducers used in fluid lines and tanks contain secondary
pressure seals. In the case of pressure transducers, these can be provided by the
reference chamber seals.
Manned Spacecraft Center
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Houston, Texas, October 29, 1971
914-50-DJ-96-72
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APPENDIX
LUNAR MODULE
CAUTION AND WARNING SYSTEM
CHARACTERISTICS AND NU SANCE ALARMS
INTRODUCTION
For reference purposes and for aid in locating specific caution and warning cir-
cuits, pertinent information is listed in the following table.
Measurement Indicator
-,.Nomenclature Page
code number number
GL4022 6DS2 Ascent low-pressure warning 21
GL4023 6DS3 Helium pressure regulator outlet manifold 22
warning
GL4026 6DS6 Control electronics section ac power-supply 24
failure warning
GL4027 6DS7 Control electronics section dc power-supply 24
failure warning
GL4028 6DS8 Abort guidance section power-supply failure 26
warning
GL4029 6DS9 Primary guidance and navigation section LM 29
guidance computer warning
GL4031 6DS11 Reaction control subsystem thrust chamber 30
assembly jet-failure warning
GL4032 6DS12 Reaction control subsystem helium regulator 32
outlet pressure warning (system A)
GL4033 6DS13 Reaction control subsystem helium regulator 32
outlet pressure warning (system B)
GL4037 6DS17 Suit/fan warning 33
GL4046 6DS26 Electrical power subsystem inverter caution 36
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______________________,------.
Measurement Indicator Nomenclature Page
code number number
GL4048 6DS28 Rendezvous radar data-no-good caution 37
GL4049 6DS29 Landing radar data-no-good caution 39
GL4051 6DS31 Explosive devices malfunction caution 40
GL4053 6DS33 Heater caution (RCS quad-cluster 42
temperatures)
GL4053 6DS33 Heater caution (landing radar antenna 42
temperatures)
GL4056 6DS36 Environmental control subsystem caution 45
GL4060 6DS40 S-band receiver (automatic gain control 45
alarm) caution
GL4024 6DS4 Low descent propellant quantity warning 46
ASCENT LOW-PRESSURE WARNING
Characteristic
Ascent low-pressure warning is ON when the CWEA is first activated and remains
ON until ascent pressurization.
Discussion
The ascent propellant tanks are loaded to capacity for a "G" (lunar landing) mis-
sion with a resulting small ullage volume. Prior to launch, a blanket pressure of he-
lium (approximately 180 psia) is applied to the propellant tanks. However, because of
the relatively small volume of helium, absorption of helium by the propellants causes
this blanket pressure to decay below the CWEA trip level of 120 psia. As a result of
this absorption, low inlet pressures (<120 psia) at the engine isolation valves are ex-
pected during the LM-5 mission, at initial CWEA turn-on (ground elapsed time 94:37).
This condition will cause initiation (at CWEA activation) of an ascent pressure warning
that cannot be removed prior to ascent pressurization.
mpact on LM-5
The ascent pressure failure-detection circuit (fig. 18) consists of four separate
parameters in OR-gate configuration. An out-of-tolerance condition existing at any one
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Rgure 18. Ascent pressure failure-detection circuit.
of the four input parameters activates the warning light. Once the light is activated,
subsequent failures at the other inputs cannot be detected. Because an out-of-tolerance
condition is expected as a result of low isolation-valve inlet pressure (GP1501 and
GP1503), an ascent helium leak (GP0001 or GP0002) cannot be detected by the CWEA.
Helium tank pressures are available to the crew by means of onboard digital display
and to the MSFN by means of telemetry.
HELIUM PRESSURE REGULATOR OUTLET MANIFOLD WARNING
Characteristic 1
Venting of descent helium will cause a descent helium regulator warning indica-
tion and a master alarm.
Discussion. The fuel vent (GQ3500X) and the oxidizer vent (GQ4000X) are used to
vent the descent helium shortly after lunar landing. The helium regulator outlet pres-
sure (GQ3018P) will fall below the CWEA trip level of 219. 2 psia and activate warning
light GL4023 (fig. 19) and the master alarm.
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Figure 19. Helium pressure regulator manifold failure-detection circuit.
Corrective action. The master alarm should be reset. The warning light will be
extinguished automatically at staging. However, it can be extinguished before staging
by cycling the CWEA circuit breaker following removal of descent engine arm.
Characteristic 2
A false descent helium regulator warning occurs with the descent engine control
assembly (DECA) circuit breaker open.
Discussion. Characteristic 2 is caused by a gradual decrease of insulation re-
sistance in the DECA Jennings relay after repeated operations. When the DECA cir-
cuit breaker is closed, +28 volts is fed to the SCEA input, biasing the SCEA to an off
position. This bias voltage effectively reduces the sensitivity of the SCEA input, making
the SCEA insensitive to the open-contact resistance of the Jennings relay. However,
when this bias voltage is not present (DECA circuit breaker open), the sensitivity of the
SCEA increases to a point at which the open-contact resistance of the Jennings relay
appears to the SCEA as a closed contact. This condition is recognized by the CWEA as
a descent engine arm signal from the DECA with no helium pressure in the manifold,
and the master alarm is activated.
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Corrective action for LM-3 and LM-4. No hardware change will be implemented.
During vehicle ground checkout, a false descent regulator alarm may occur any time the
DECA circuit breaker is open. This occurrence should be expected on these vehicles.
For flight operation, a procedural change to close the DECA power circuit breaker
before the CWEA circuit breaker is closed has been incorporated in the Apollo Opera-
tions Handbook (AOH).
Corrective action for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. A biasing resistor is in-
stalled between the SCEA-1 circuit breaker and the power lead to the DECA. This re
sistor applies a bias voltage to the SCEA input whenever the CWEA breaker is closed
and is independent of the position of the DECA circuit breaker.
CONTROL ELECTRONICS SECTION ac AND dc
POWER-SUPPLY FAILURE WARNINGS
Characteristic
This condition is characterized by a loss of failure-detection capability during the
power-up sequence.
Discussion
Each control electronics section (CES) power-supply output is monitored by an
individual level detector in the CWEA (figs. 20 and 21). Each level detector is designed
to produce a logic zero at its output if the power supply being monitored is delivering
a voltage within predetermined levels. If the power supply exceeds these levels (either
above or below), a logic one is produced at the output of the level detector. The out-
puts of each group (ac or dc) of level detectors are OR-gated and fed to their respective
flip-flops. When all power supplies are in limits, a logic zero from the output of each
level detector is applied to the flip-flop. The flip-flop is in the reset state with a logic
zero at its output. If any power supply goes out of limits, a logic one is transferred
to the input of the flip-flop. This transition from a logic zero to a logic one at the
input to the flip-flop is required to set the flip-flop, activate the master alarm, and
illuminate the annunciator light.
During LM missions, the CWEA is turned on prior to activation of the CES power
supplies. As a result, the level detectors in the CWEA sense zero voltages at their
respective inputs and produce logic ones at their outputs. The flip-flop is set, the
annunciator lights are turned on, and the master alarm is activated. The annunciator
lights can be extinguished by resetting the Hip-flop by means of the rate gyro assembly
gyro test switch. This action, however, does not remove the logic one at the input
to the Hip-flop.
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Figure 20. Control electronics section dc power-supply failure-detection circuit.
When the CES power supplies are subsequently turned on by means of the ATCA
circuit breaker, two possibilities exist.
1. All power supplies operate normally and are in limits. In this case, the logic
one at the input to the flip-flop is removed, and the failure-detection circuits are
able to recognize a subsequent power-supply failure.
2. One or more of the power supplies fails to come within limits. In this case,
the logic one remains at the input to the flip-flop, and the failure-detection circuits
are unable to detect the failure.
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Figure 21. Control electronics section ac power-supply failure-detection circuit.
Corrective Action for LM-3 and Subsequent Vehicles
A procedural change to the AOH power-up sequence provides for recycling the
CWEA circuit breaker after closing the ATCA circuit breaker. This procedure will
ensure that the previous CES power-supply failure indications (caused by an open ATCA
circuit breaker) registered in the CWEA circuits are erased, that the flip-flops are re-
set, and that the annunciator lights are extinguished. The CWEA will be fully enabled
to detect any existing or subsequent failures. This same procedure also should be used
during ground checkout to ensure that a failed CES power supply will not go undetected.
ABORT GUI DANCE SECTION POWER-SUPPLY FAILURE WARNING
Characteristic 1
A master alarm occurs when the abort guidance section (AGS) status switch is
placed in the standby or operate position.
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Discussion. The CWEA abort guidance circuit (fig. 22) monitors four separate
AGS parameters. Three of these are power-supply parameters located in the abort
sensor assembly (ASA). The fourth parameter being monitored is the abort electronics
assembly (AEA) test mode fail (TMF). All four parameters are OR-gated and fed to a
dual-input AND-gate, which is inhibited when the AGS status switch is in the off position.
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Figure 22. Abort guidance section power-supply failure-detection circuit.
Abort guidance section power up: A master alarm occurs when the AGS status
switch is moved from the off position to the standby position. In this case, the CWEA
inhibit is removed and the ASA power supplies are turned on. The AGS warning light
will stay on until the AEA circuit breaker is closed and all ASA power supplies reach a
stabilized, in-limits condition, removing the failed indication from the CWEA input.
The 400-hertz ASA power supply is derived from a 128-kpps clock pulse provided by
the AEA; therefore, the AEA circuit breaker must be closed to extinguish the AGS
warning light in the standby position.
A master alarm occurs when the AGS status switch is moved from the standby
position to the operate position. In this case, the AEA operational power supplies are
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turned on and the hardwired memory cores are primed in the AEA memory. This ac-
tion sets the TMF Hip-flop, indicating a failure for approximately 200 milliseconds un-
til the core priming is complete.
Abort guidance section power down: A master alarm occurs when the AGS status
switch is moved from the operate position to the standby position to the off position.
The AOH power-down procedures place the stabilization and control (S&C): AEA
circuit breaker in the open position, prior to moving the AGS status switch out of the
operate position. An AGS warning will result from loss of the AEA 128-kpps clock
pulse to the 400-hertz ASA power supply. The AGS warning light will remain on until
the AGS status switch is placed in the off position.
Corrective action for IM-3 and LM-4. Characteristic 1 is noted in the AOH as
an expected alarm during operation of the AGS status switch. The crew will acknowl-
edge and reset the master alarm as part of the procedure.
Corrective jiction for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. Because of a design change
in the CWEA (addition of a flip-flop to AEA TMF logic), an additional AOH procedure is
required for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. When the AGS status switch is placed in
the operate position, an AEA TMF is generated and the flip-flop is set. The crew must(1) reset the flip-flop by manually placing the environmental control subsystem (ECS)
Og/HgO quantity monitor switch in the CWEA reset position (to extinguish the AGS warn
ing light) and (2) use the data entry and display assembly (DEDA) to verify the status of
the AEA.
Characteristic 2
A master alarm occurs during operation of the AGS with no accompanying AGS
annunciator light.
Discussion. Characteristic 2 is caused by a short-duration loss of memory in
the AEA, resulting in an AEA restart. The failure is detected by the CWEA, and a
master alarm is generated. The AGS annunciator light will be illuminated while the
failure exists and will be extinguished automatically when the failure is removed. If
the failure is of short duration (on the order of milliseconds), the annunciator light
will only blink on and off and can go undetected.
Corrective action for LM-3 and LM-4. The AOH will be revised to note the pos-
sible occurrence of an AEA restart, initiating a master alarm with no CWEA annuncia-
tor light. The AOH procedure will direct the crew to use the DEDA to verify AEA
status.
Corrective action for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. A flip-flop was added to the
AEA TMF logic to preclude the possibility of an undetected AEA restart. With the in-
corporation of this change to the CWEA, all AEA failures will set the flip-flop, initiate
a master alarm, and illuminate the AGS warning annunciator light. The annunciator
light will remain on until manually reset by placing the ECS On/HnO quantity monitor
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switch in the CWEA reset position. Resetting the Hip-flop will extinguish the AGS warn-
ing light and enable the CWEA to monitor subsequent failures. The ability to extinguish
the AGS warning light with the reset verifies that the failure occurred in the AEA. The
current status of the AEA then must be verified by using the DEDA. If the AGS warning
light is activated by an ASA power-supply failure, it cannot be extinguished by using the
reset capability.
PRIMARY GUI DANCE AND NAVIGATION SECTION
LM GU DANCE COMPUTER WARNING
Characteristic
A false master alarm may be generated with activation of the LM guidance com-
puter (LGC)/display and keyboard (DSKY) circuit breaker subsequent to turn-on of the
CWEA circuit breaker (fig. 23).
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Figure 23. Lunar module guidance computer failure-detection circuit.
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Discussion
If the CWEA circuit breaker is closed and the LGC/DSKY circuit breaker is open,
the LGC fail relay will be in the deenergized state and the CWEA will initiate a master
alarm. Subsequent closure of the LGC/DSKY circuit breaker will produce one of the
following conditions.
1. hi the majority of cases, the warning light will be extinguished immediately
because the LGC fail relay will be energized immediately, and a master alarm will not
be generated.
2. In some cases, as a result of LGC variables, it is possible that the LGC fail
relay will be interrupted momentarily, causing a false master alarm to be displayed
for as long as 20 seconds.
Corrective Action for LM-3 and Subsequent Vehicles
A procedural note is included in the AOH to indicate that an alarm, with accom-
panying LGC warning light illuminated for as long as 20 seconds, should be expected
when the LGC/DSKY circuit breaker is closed.
REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM THRUST CHAMBER
ASSEMBLY JET-FAILURE WARNING
Characteristic
False jet-failure indications occur with thrust chamber assembly (TCA) quad
circuit breakers open.
Discussion
Extremely long wire-runs from the TCA quad circuit breakers, to the jet-driver
solenoids on the quad clusters, back to the ATCA, and, finally, to the SCEA are the
cause of this condition. When the quad circuit breakers are closed, +28 volts is fed to
the SCEA inputs, effectively biasing the SCEA to an off condition (fig. 24). When the
quad circuit breakers are open, these long-lead lengths at the input to the SCEA act as
antennas and are susceptible to noise pickups. Because no biasing voltage is present
at the SCEA input, the noise appears to the SCEA as jet-driver commands. These false
jet-driver commands can indicate a failed-TCA-jet condition and activate the master
alarm by either of two paths:
1. By means of the counters in the CWEA logic when seven consecutive commands
are received without an accompanying thruster response
2. By means of the opposing jet logic in the CWEA when commands are sent si-
multaneously to opposing jets
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Figure 24. Reaction control subsystem TCA failure-detection circuit.
Corrective Action for LM-3 and LM-4
No hardware change will be implemented. During vehicle ground checkout, any
indication of jet failures with the TCA quad breakers open should not be considered a
problem worthy of any further investigation. For flight operation, a procedural work-
around has been included in the AOH to preclude an erroneous jet-failure indication dur-
ing the periods of the mission when the ECS is powered down for an extravehicular
activity (EVA) period. The procedural workaround is as follows. Prior to EVA, all
quad circuit breakers are open and all (eight) counters in the CWEA logic are loaded
by operation of the thrust/translation controller assembly to induce a failure in all
quads. The master alarm is reset, and no possibility of an erroneous jet-failure alarm
exists during the EVA period. At the conclusion of EVA, the CWEA circuit breaker is
cycled (off/on) to enable the CWEA to detect subsequent failures.
Corrective Action for LM-5 and Subsequent Vehicles
Biasing resistors are installed between the SCEA-1 and CWEA circuit breakers
and the jet-driver solenoid lines. These resistors effectively apply a bias voltage to
the SCEA input whenever the SCEA and CWEA circuit breakers are closed and are in-
dependent of the position of the quad-cluster circuit breakers.
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REACTION CONTROL SUBSYSTEM HELIUM REGULATOR
OUTLET PRESSURE WARN ING
Characteristic
The RCS helium regulator warning lights come on prior to pressurization (fig. 25).
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Figure 25. Reaction control subsystem helium pressure regulator
failure-detection circuit.
Discussion
Current RCS procedure calls for the main propellant valves of RCS systems A
and B to be opened before launch. By placing these valves in the open position, the RCS
helium regulator warning circuits in the CWEA are enabled. This procedure will cause
both RCS helium regulator warning lights to come on when the CWEA circuit breaker is
first closed. Both lights will remain on until the RCS system is pressurized.
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Corrective Action for LM-3 and Subsequent Vehicles
No hardware change will be implemented. A note alerting the crew to this charac-
teristic will be added to the AOH procedure.
SUIT/FAN WARN ING
Characteristic
Switching from suit fan 1 to suit fan 2 (under a condition of low differential pres-
sure with fan condition signal-control relay K12 energized) may cause two successive
suit/fan warnings (fig. 26).
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Figure 26. Environmental control subsystem suit outlet pressure
failure-detection circuit.
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Discussion
The first warning occurs because of the time required for suit fan 2 to build up
enough pressure to open the differential pressure switch; that is, relay K12 is still en-
ergized at the instant of switching. The crew then resets the master alarm. The sec-
ond warning would occur approximately 5 to 10 seconds after relay K12 opens and is
dependent on the specific characteristics of the individual SCEA module and the CWEA
detector. Because of a 25-microfarad capacitance across the contacts of relay K12,
the SCEA input voltage rises exponentially rather than discretely. This characteristic,
combined with the internal feedback characteristics of the 504-3 SCEA buffer, produces
a short period of output voltage oscillation. If this oscillation occurs after the CWEA
has reset, the second master alarm may occur. Note that the component warning light
will be extinguished. Additional characteristics of this circuit are included in table I.
TABLE I. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUIT FAN CAUTION (GL4056) AND WARNING (UL4037) CIRCUITS
Display characteristics and conditions
Position and cycling of
suit fan select ECS component liKhl_______
switch 7S1
----^----- ^ ECScl^nIi^ suitfanwain.n, !,,,,, Master a.arn,suit fan HnO separator
Oft On On On Off Yes
If suit fan No driving power, Caused by HnO sep.ir.tlor Caused by HyO bcp.iralor
differential both suit fans
pressure (AP) ofl "’.n’n "" ..npeller speed
circuit breaker
<-800 rpn, <800 ipm
closed
Off to suit fan On On On Off No
Goes out when Goes out when H O Goes out when HnO Sl.iya off Has been prior
suit fan AP Does monitor fan sriecliun of fan
is established separator impel- separator impel- npprat.nn caused bv H 0 sep.r.ler speed exceeds ter speed exceeds n^isde7ner^ed 800 rpm 800 rpm impeller speed <800 rpm
Suit fan to off Off Off Off Off Yes
Goes when Goes when impel- Goes when impeller Stays off When impeller speed drops
loss of ^P ler speed drops speed drops below below 800 rpm
energizes below 800 rpm 800 rpm
relay K12
Off to suit fan On On On Off Yes
(passing quickly Goes out when Goes out when H O Goes when H O Goes out when suit fan When fan selected be-
through suit fan suit fan AP selected relay K12
position) is established separator impel- separator impel-
^
energized by
and relay K12 lerspeed exceeds ^^
exceeds
lished and relay K12 absence of A’P
is deenergized uuu rpm rpm deenergized If master alarm reset
May blink again approxi- immediately, the al.irm
mately to 10 later may be generated ai;ain
from action of capacitor from action of the
relay K12 contacts pacitor the
tacts of relay K12
Suit fan to off Off Off Off Off Yes
(passing quickly Goes when Goes when Goes when impeller Stays off When impeller speed
through suit fan loss of AP impeller speed speed drops below drops below 800 rpm
position) when suit energizes drops below 800 rpm
fan did not fail relay K12 800 rpm
Suit fan to suit Off Off Off Off Yes
fan without fan Blinks and Stays off Stays off Blinks on, then off when Relay K12 is energized by
failure off when Inertia of impeller Does not monitor suit fan AP drops below drop in AP during
momentary maintains speed fan operation normal faster than fan switchover
loss of AP >800 rpm during restore AP If master alarm is reset
energizes switchover May blink and off immediately, the alarm
relay K12 ond time, to 10 may be generated again
after AP is established, by the capacitor action
from action of capacitor the contacts of
relay K12 contacts relay K12
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TABLE I. CHARACTERISTICS OF SUIT FAN CAUTION (GL40S6) AND WARNING (GL4037) CIRCUITS Concluded
Display characteristics and conditions
Position and cycling of g^g component light
suit tan select 8DS36 6DS17 M-isler il-irm
switch 7S1 TDSl 7DS7 EC’S caution light suit fan warning light
suit fan HnO separator
Suit tan to suit On Ofl On Olf Yes
fan 2, resulting When drop Comes if impeller When drop in AP Conies when suit fan is When drop in AP
from fan failure in AP speed drops below gizes relay K12 selected gizes relay K12
gizes relay K12 800 rpm before If HnO separator impeller Goes out when AP is If master alarm is rrsel
Goes off when selection of suit stored and relay K12 is prior to selecting suit
AP is restored fan 2 bpeed
docs
""’I., deenergized fan 2, second alarm
and relay K12
t"’l"w a00 rpm; lli’11 May blink and oft to will be generated when’
is deenergized """I’o’c 10 llt^ fronl clio" t’’" is !iclelt(d
of capacitor If alarm is reset
If impeller speed does
^,
^
contacts diately, third alarm
drop below 800 rpm,
^y
^
generated to
light will go out when ,g .^^
^
swund
impeller speed
^^
,,y y^c,n of
>800 rpm pacitor the
tacts of relay K12
Suit tan 2 to suit Off Off Off Oft Yes
fan 1, without suit Blinks ;md Stays oft Blinks and oft when Stays off When drop AP
fan failure oft when Inertia of impeller momentary loss of Does not monitor fan gizes relay K12
momentary maintains speed AP energizes operation If reset immediately,
loss of AP >800 rpm during lay K12 second alarm may be
energizes switchover May blink and off generated to 10
relay K12 second lime, after AP is restored
10 after AP is by action of capacitor
restored, from relay K12
action of capacitor contacts
relay K12
contacts
Suit fan to suit On Ofl Oft On Yes
fan (suit fan When drop in AP Comes if impeller Comes when fan is Results from drop in AP Results when drop in AP
failure, fan is energizes speed drops below selected result energizing relay K12 energizes relay K12
good) lay K12 800 rpm before of low AP Goes out and stays out when result of fan failure
Goes oft when selection of suit It H O separator impel- suit tan select switch is If master alarm reset
AP is restored fan moved from fan position prior selection of
and relav K12
speed does ;,
^
second?s deenergTzed drop bclo’v 800 rpm- .>l"m will be generateddeenergized
,,g^
^ ^ ^^ ^^ ^ ^
selected
AP is restored
,.^K g, ^CS
Light may blink and caution
oft second time
^
^n, reset imme-
to 10 after AP diately third alarm
is restored from
^y
^
generated to
action of capacitor ,
^^
^p
contacts of restored by action of
relay K12 capacitor
It H^O separator impel- ,^y
^^
contacts
ler speed does drop This third alarm will not
below 880 rpm, light if the impeller
will go out when im- speed drops and remains
peller speed >800 rpm below 800 rpm for
The light may blink than 10 after AP is
and on second time restored
only if impeller speed
reaches 800 rpm in
<5 after AP is
established
Corrective Action
No hardware changes were implemented. The crew will be made aware of this
situation by means of the AOH.
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ELECTRICAL POWER SUBSYSTEM INVERTER CAUTION
Characteristic
An inverter caution occurs when selecting either inverter from the off position
(fig. 27).
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Figure 27. Electrical power subsystem inverter voltage and frequency
failure-detection circuit.
Cause
This instrumentation characteristic is strictly one of timing. With the inverter-
select switch in the off position, no inverter voltage is applied to the SCEA and the
CWEA. This condition is analogous to a failed inverter to the CWEA detection circuits,
and a failed signal is applied to the output AND-gate. Actuation of the inverter caution
is prevented by the inhibit voltage applied through the off position of the inverter-select
switch to the other input of this AND-gate. When the inverter-select switch is moved
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from the off position, the inhibit voltage is removed immediately and the inverter cau-
tion light is illuminated with an accompanying master alarm. The inverter light is not
extinguished until after the inverter voltage has been processed by the SCEA and the
CWEA and an in-limits voltage and an in-limits frequency have been established.
Corrective Action for LM-3 and LM-4
No hardware change will be implemented. During vehicle ground checkout, an
inverter caution should be expected when an inverter is selected from the off position.
For flight operation, a procedural change to select an inverter before closing
the CWEA circuit breaker has been incorporated in the AOH.
Corrective Action for LM-5 and Subsequent Vehicles
Removal of inhibit voltage is delayed until inverter voltage has been proc-
essed by tile SCEA and the CWEA. The delay is incorporated into CWEA part
number LSC-360-8-11-9.
RENDEZVOUS RADAR DATA-NO-GOOD CAUTION
Characteristic
A master alarm occurs when the rendezvous radar (RR) mode-select switch is
placed in the "auto track" position.
Discussion
When the RR mode-select switch is placed in the auto track position, the range-
tracker circuit and the CWEA are enabled. A no-track signal is sent to the CWEA, and
a master alarm is initiated. The RR caution light remains on until the range tracker
locks on to the radar return signals and the no-track signal is removed from the CWEA.
Corrective Action for LM-3 and LM-4
No hardware change is incorporated (fig. 28). A procedural change has been in-
corporated in the AOH to alert the crew to expect occurrence of and to reset the master
alarm when placing the RR mode-select switch in the auto track position. A similar
procedure should be used for vehicle ground checks.
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(a) Early landing radar logic, (b) Early rendezvous radar logic.
Figure 28. Radar data-no-good indicators for LM-3 and LM-4.
Corrective Action for LM-5 and Subsequent Vehicles
A wiring change in the vehicle harness to interchange the RR and landing radar
(LR) CWEA logic circuits has been incorporated (fig. 29). The logic now used by the
RR requires that a data-good signal be established to enable the CWEA. Therefore, a
master alarm cannot be initiated when the RR mode-select switch is placed in the auto
track position during track acquisition. Once track is established and a data-good sig-
nal is issued, the CWEA logic is enabled and will activate the master alarm if a subse-
quent loss of track occurs.
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-----|---~\
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(a) Revised landing radar logic.
Figure 29. Radar data-no-good indicators for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles.
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(b) Revised rendezvous radar logic.
Figure 29. Concluded.
LANDING RADAR DATA-NO-GOOD CAUTION
Characteristic
When the primary guidance and navigation section/LR circuit breaker is opened,
a master alarm occurs.
Discussion
When power is removed from the LR, the data-good relay contacts open a few
milliseconds before the power-on relay contacts.
Corrective Action for LM-3 and UVl-4
The LR equipment installed on LM-3 and LM-4 has been modified to provide both
velocity and range data-good signals to the CWEA (fig. 28) during all modes of radar
operation. As a result, the only master alarm that should be generated by the LR
equipment for these vehicles is the one described previously.
A procedural change has been incorporated in the AOH to inform the crew to ex-
pect occurrence of and to reset the master alarm when the LR is powered down. A
similar procedure should be used during vehicle ground checkout.
Corrective Action for LM-5 and Subsequent Vehicles
The LR measurement has been removed from the CWEA (fig. 29) because of a
high probability that an undesirable alarm would occur during the hover maneuver of
the landing approach.
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EXPLOS IVE DEVICES MALFUNCTION CAUTION
Characteristic 1
An explosive devices (ED) malfunction alarm occurs when the abort stage switch
is reset after staging.
Discussion. When the abort stage switch (fig. 30) is depressed, ED relay Kl is
set and the ED bus is armed. This action completes the contact closure path in the
relay "daisy chain" (relays Kl to K6) and provides an input to the CWEA. The master
alarm does not operate, however, because S&C relay K19 also is energized by the
abort stage switch and inhibits the CWEA. A third set of contacts on the abort stage
switch signals the CES to issue a stage command. This stage command from the CES
sets relay K2, which initiates staging by sequentially energizing relays K3 to K6.
Vehicle SCEA CWEA PCMTEA and
ED relay box sys A displays
r-1 ^-D--1 ^H^T^A) Stage H ^------ -f- ’’">. PCMTEAED bus I ,, ^ ^--jM^-----------------^ .Gy0201)+28Vdc K3
,y K5’
H-OT-I-.-A/- Bolts,-| )-^ L---------------
’-I" 2DS1
Kl vtr ) caution
K5 Cable cutter,-| t-S b light
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-rT~-’- v-
-D K4 r
ij ’^.^
i- --! K6 nelay, -| m-5^- -* ^.5 V dc 1 ^’"1 ’’I1"’""’1-r-V"’
^
relays ^s A
L-^-
^r |
ED bus -DN2 Stage switch. -] [- ^i g
LJ I 5
[(TKI |
Master ^.^ I-----
Panel ’SSH Panel Bin
4CB76 K^,reset l\
+28 f~|
^
?S8___________ F"A 1 +)-^\Vfc_Lr^_
^
~y Stage reset------1-’ iK^ey"^ Sys -./ )-,
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ED bus DN2____________
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Figure 30. Explosive devices subsystem stage sequence failure-detection circuit.
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Resetting the abort stage switch after staging removes the inhibit voltage from the
CWEA by deenergizing relay K19. Relay Kl is reset, removing the +28 volts from the
ED bus and deenergizing relays K3 to K6. Relay K2 has no automatic-reset capability
and, therefore, completes the closed-contact path to the SCEA input, activating the
master alarm.
Corrective action for LM-3 and subsequent vehicles. No hardware change will
be implemented. A procedural change has been incorporated in the AOH to place the
master arm switch in the on position before resetting the abort stage switch. This ac-
tion will inhibit the CWEA. The ED logic A and B circuit breakers are to be opened
after staging to remove any unnecessary power drain. The same procedure should be
used during vehicle ground testing.
Characteristic 2
An ED malfunction alarm occurs when the master arm switch is moved from ON
to OFF at the completion of normal staging sequence.
Discussion. During normal staging, placing the master arm switch in the on
position inhibits the CWEA and arms the ED bus by setting relay Kl. Staging can be
accomplished automatically by firing the ascent engine or manually by closing the stage
switch without firing the ascent engine. In either case, relay K2 is set and initiates the
staging sequence. At the completion of staging, if the master arm switch is placed in
the off position, the inhibit voltage is removed from the CWEA and relay Kl is reset,
causing reconfiguration of relays K3 to K6. Relay K2 has no automatic reset; thus, it
completes the closed-contact path to the SCEA and activates the master alarm.
Corrective action for LM-3 and subsequent vehicles. A procedural change has
been incorporated in the AOH to leave the master arm switch in the on position after
staging to inhibit the CWEA. The ED logic A and B circuit breakers are to be opened
after staging to remove any unnecessary power drain.
Characteristic 3
An ED malfunction alarm occurs when the master arm switch is moved from ON
to OFF at the completion of any ED function other than staging.
Discussion. Relay K2 is not set during ED functions that do not involve staging.
This alarm condition is of short duration and exists during the time required to reset
relay Kl, after the inhibit voltage has been removed from the CWEA.
Corrective action for LM-3 and LM-4. A procedural change to the AOH has been
incorporated to infornTthe crew to expect the occurrence of and to reset the master
alarm. A similar procedure should be used during ground check.
Corrective action for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. Removal of inhibit voltage
is delayed while relay Kl is reset. This change is incorporated into CWEA part num-
ber LSC-360-8-11-9.
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With the hardware change incorporated in the CWEA to delay the removal of the
inhibit voltage when relay K19 is deenergized or the master arm switch is placed in the
off position, it is recognized that manually resetting relay K2 after staging also would
prevent the occurrence of a master alarm. However, any subsequent engine firing
would set relay K2 and initiate a master alarm.
HEATER CAUTION (RCS QUAD-CLUSTER TEMPERATURES)
As a result of data obtained during the LM-3 flight and subsequent RCS red-line-
temperature ground tests, the following design changes have been implemented.
Design Change for LM-4
The CWEA trip levels for the RCS quad-cluster temperature measurements have
been changed to 113 and 241 F. During certain phases of the mission (such as dock-
ing), a master alarm is still possible and should be expected during normal procedures.
This possible master alarm will be noted in the LM-4 AOH procedures.
Design Change for LM-5 and Subsequent Vehicles
The RCS quad-cluster temperatures have been deleted from the CWEA by cutting
the interface wiring between the SCEA and the CWEA. This change will cause a heater
caution indication and a master alarm when the CWEA circuit breaker is initially closed
and will be included as an expected master alarm in the AOH procedures. The heater
caution light must be reset by rotating the temperature monitor switch through the four
RCS quad temperature positions.
HEATER CAUTION (LR ANTENNA TEMPERATURES)
Characteristic 1
Characteristic 1 is caused by the lack of a staging enable to the CWEA logic
(fig. 31). When vehicle staging is performed, the wiring to the LR temperature sensor
is severed by the cable cutter. This operation places an open circuit at the input to
the SCEA, which is analogous to an out-of-temperature condition at the high end; and
the CWEA initiates a master alarm.
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^________^ R_ circuit was added to the LR temperature
logic (internal to CWEA part number
Figure 31. Heater caution circuit. LSC-360-8-11-9) to inhibit this circuit at
staging. Subsequent to this change, two
other undesirable characteristics of this circuit were identified. During touchdown
on a lunar landing mission, heat from the descent engine plume will be reflected back
to the LR antenna from the lunar surface. This heat will cause the LR antenna temper-
ature to go beyond the upper limits and initiate a master alarm during a period of high
activity. After landing, the LR electronics and antenna heater circuit breakers are
opened to conserve battery power. Following an undetermined period of cold soak on
the lunar surface, the antenna temperature would gradually decrease to an in-limits
condition, remove the failure indication to the CWEA, and enable it for future failures.
The antenna temperature would continue to decrease until it eventually reached the out-
of-limits condition on the low end and would initiate a second master alarm.
A high probability exists that this second alarm condition could occur during an
EVA period. The master alarm would alert the ground crew to a failure that could be
identified; however, with both crewmembers on EVA, the master alarm could not be
reset and, thus, could not be used as a cue to ground personnel in the event of a sub-
sequent failure.
Because both of these alarm conditions would occur when the LR equipment was
no longer required, they could serve only to hinder the completion of the mission. As
a result, measurement of LR antenna temperature has been removed from the CWEA.
This modification was accomplished by removing the stage enable at the input to the
CWEA.
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The following measurements are OR-gated inputs to GL4053.
1. GR6001T (LM-4 only) -quad cluster number 4 temperature (<ll3 and
>241 F)
2. GR6002T (LM-4 only) -quad cluster number 3 temperature (<113 and
>241 F)
3. GR6003T (LM-4 only) -quad cluster number 2 temperature (<113 and
>241 F)
4. GR6004T (LM-4 only) -quad cluster number 1 temperature (<113 and
>241 F)
5. GN7723T RR antenna temperature (< -54. 1 and > 147. 7 F)
6. GT0454T S-band antenna assembly temperature (< -64. 1 and >152. 6 F)
Characteristic 2
An in-limits temperature condition first must be established to enable the CWEA
to detect a failed-off heater (fig. 31). The antenna heaters are activated before lift-off
and are, therefore, not affected by this characteristic during flight.
Discussion. An in-limits temperature condition for the parameters identified
previously will produce a logic zero at the output of the detectors (fig. 31). An out-
of-limits temperature condition on any of these parameters will produce a logic one
at the output of its associated detector. A transition from a logic zero (in-limits con-
dition) to a logic one (out-of-limits condition) at the detector output is required to set
a flip-flop. When any flip-flop is set, the heater caution light is turned on and a master
alarm is initiated. The caution light can be extinguished manually by resetting the flip-
flop with temperature monitor select switch 18S10. However, the failed indication (a
logic one) still remains at the output of the detector and can be removed only by es-
tablishing an in-limits temperature condition (logic zero).
During LM missions, the RCS quad heaters are turned on after the crew transfers
to the LM. The CWEA is turned on after activation of the heaters but before the quad
temperatures have reached a normal operating level. Therefore, a failed indication
(logic one) exists at the output of the low-level detectors and all four quad-cluster
flip-flops are set when the CWEA is turned on. The flip-Hops are reset manually by
rotating switch 18S10, but the logic ones at the output of the detectors effectively in-
hibit the CWEA until the heaters raise the quad temperatures to within normal limits.
If a heater should fail off before an in-limits condition is established, the failure will
not be detected by the CWEA.
Corrective action for LM-3 and LM-4. The crew is instructed by the AOH to
periodically monitor the quad-cluster temperatures after turn-on, to verify that the
temperatures have reached an in-limits condition. Once this condition has been estab-
lished, the CWEA is enabled and will detect any subsequent heater failures.
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jPOSSI BLE MASTER ALARM RESULTING FROM CARBON
DIOXI DE SENSOR (ECS CAUTION)
Discussion 3 Ij-n.r1"’------
6 U |_J CO, sensor and CWEA
A master alarm may occur during g combined error band
vehicle ground checkout when the carbon |
^dioxide (C0) sensor circuit breaker is
^closed (fig. 32). This possibility results ^18
from a transient voltage produced by the "
^ ^^^^^^^^COy sensor when power is applied. The ’4
magnitude of this transient voltage varies 30
^ ^ ^ ^ ^
^^3-^
with CO, sensors and may not be sufficient 03^42 03:51:00 03:51:12
Time. hr:min:sec
to trip the ECS caution light and produce a
master alarm. A master alarm resulting
from this characteristic has been experi- Figure 32. Typical plot of carbon
enced only during checkout of one vehicle dioxide pressure variation during
(LM-4). ground checkout.
Corrective Action for LM-3 and Subsequent Vehicles
The COn sensor characteristic will not cause a master alarm during inflight2t
checkout of the vehicle if existing AOH procedures are followed. Existing procedures
call for closing the COq sensor circuit breaker before the master alarm circuit breaker2
is closed. During ground checkout, a master alarm may occur if the CO, sensor
breaker is closed after the CWEA and master alarm breakers are closed.
S-BAND RECEIVER (AUTOMATIC GAIN
CONTROL ALARM) CAUTION SCEA CWEA
_J^^. _^GT0994
Discussion s-oJ94 ^"
<L071V
receiver
_T^^JS--sl_J\ caution-i
At the completion of the S-band rang-
AGC 1^^
^
’’’BAND RCVR!
ing function, the S-band range-function
^^
J-R__ GL4()60
switch (13S1) is placed in the off/reset po- ^__ ___|
sition (fig. 33). This action will reset the L ____^^
S-band caution circuit. However, any sub- OFF/RESET
sequent decrease of the S-band automatic c^-
gain control (AGC) voltage (as a result of S"
signal fading) below the CWEA reference
level, while the switch remains in the off/
^reset position, will register a failure in the Range-function
CWEA memory. Subsequent enabling of the switch
S-band caution indicator would cause a Figure 33. S-band receiver AGC
master alarm, failure-detection circuit.
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Corrective Action for LM-3 and Subsequent Vehicles
This condition can be avoided by placing the S-band range-function switch momen-
tarily in the range position immediately prior to enabling the CWEA. This action will
reset the S-band caution circuit and remove any prior failures.
LOW DESCENT PROPELLANT QUANTITY WARNING
Characteristic 1
A high probability exists for the occurrence of a master alarm during a normal
lunar landing.
Discussion. The GL4024 warning indication (fig. 34) was designed to alert the
crew to a propellant quantity remaining equal to 2 minutes at 25 percent thrust. There
is a high probability that the propellant level will reach this point prior to touchdown on
a normal lunar landing.
POGS control unit SCEA CWEA
-___-___--___.-------_PCM
---1H1M1---_______________________ 504 ’> r^Descent engine on ^------
.)-- 01 OTY
From Fuel tank 1_____^_\ -yr,-
low- Fuel tank 2____ Relay low ^^------ Q|;level Oxidizer lank
"^"
4-)---driver level 504 >
sensors Qxidizer lank 2 Hatching! relay
^I^-------
------,-PCM
(a) For LM-3 and LM-4.
From Fuel tank 1________\
low- Fuel lank Z_____
^
Relay Low. ^T----- -------PCM
level Oxidizer tank +)---(lrlver ’’’"I 504.r>
sensors Oxidizer tank / ’^tehmgl relay ^-T
I------ D[S OTY
(b) For LM-5 and subsequent vehicles.
Figure 34. Descent propellant low-level quantity circuit.
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VCorrective action for LM-4. No corrective action is required for the "F" (lunar
orbit) mission. The master alarm will be initiated when the descent propellant level is
equal to a 2-minute engine burn at 25 percent thrust.
Corrective action for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. The low descent propellant
quantity measurement has been removed from the CWEA and the master alarm circuits.
The low-level quantity annunciator light has been retained for this measurement on the
caution and warning array, and this light will illuminate when the propellant remaining
is equal to 2 minutes at 25 percent thrust. This visual indication will not be accom-
panied by a master alarm.
Characteristic 2
A possible low-level indication is anticipated prior to the ullage maneuver.
Discussion. If the descent propellant quantity gaging system (PQGS) is activated
before performance of the ullage maneuver, the four low-level sensors in the PQGS
may be exposed to the ullage (fig. 34). Should any one of these four sensors be exposed
to ullage, a low-level indication is latched in the PQGS control unit. On LM-5 and sub-
sequent vehicles, this condition will illuminate the annunciator light on the CWEA array.
A master alarm will not occur. On LM-4, because of logic circuitry in the CWEA, this
condition will go unnoticed until a descent engine-on command is initiated; thus, a mas-
ter alarm and a low-level quantity warning will occur when the engine is commanded to
fire.
Corrective action for LM-4. Two possible courses of action are available.
1. Recycle the PQGS after the ullage maneuver is performed and before the first
descent engine-on command is initiated.
2. Expect a possible master alarm when the descent engine is initially fired,
verify that the descent quantity light is on, and reset the master alarm.
The LM-4 AOH procedures identify this condition and specify the second course of
action.
Corrective action for LM-5 and subsequent vehicles. The AOH procedure calls
for recyclmg’tti’eTQGS subsequent to the ullage maneuver, if the descent quantity light
is on.
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